the united states, as well as in europe. so iran -- the iranian people believe this is an important thing, and it's a way of expressing themselves and making publicity about their position, and then mobilizing support. but the judgment comes -- and if it is possible to really see like an x-ray as to what israel is in the minds of people about iran's nuclear weapons ambitions, i would say the way leaked to the -- >> [inaudible] >> not many people -- it's always easier to make a form of statements, you know, until they may not even believe but this is the way in politics, but when the day comes, not many would like iran to have a bomb for

reasons that are clear. >> did you know any active scientists that were assassinated in r & d? did you know any of them? >> sure, we followed world -- >> did you personally know any of them? >> oh, no. but would it have been useful >> if i could add one thing. seldom seen, any event, anywhere in the world in which the spin both before and afterwards has been so intense about whether it was a victory for iran, was it a victory for the u.s., was it a victory for morsi, who lost or won. i would say a couple of things. first of all, i think whatever benefits iran drew from it and there were certainly some were probably bigger as a result of the campaign to prevent ban ki-moon from going there in the first place. had there not been that much of a campaign ci not recall any other nonmeeting that got so much media attention anywhere. the second point that i is this valuable to make here is

that those who are pressing the fact that ban ki-moon went and the fact that he was there, both to his face and privately and in public expressed both on the human rights abuses of iran, as well as other things, i think takes far more courage than the courage it took for those sitting in washington trying to prevent him from going or sitting here and agitating for more military policy. that's what the secretary general should be doing, going there and confronting and through dialogue presenting the types of criticisms than staying at home and saying slogans from thousands of miles away. >> here's a question for you from the overflow room, and i think it in part has been addressed, but how much do the sanctions and the threat of an attack against iranian

facilities bring iran closer to a decision to develop a nuclear weapon as opposed to deterring iran's nuclear program? >> i think it's a very good question, because it goes to the heart of the matter in the sense that at the end of the day, in order to prevent countries from going that direction, we have to not only look at the supply side of thinking, okay, how can we raise the cost for them, how can we make sure they don't have access to material, but also ask ourselves, what is it that is causing them to desire such a deterrence, and then the question is, to what extent does the threats of war or these level of sanctions that are increasingly becoming war-like change or alter iran's calculation or equation when it comes to this. so far according to the intelligence in the u.s. they've not made that decision but mindful, if we take a look at what we know the shah's government was doing and much of what the current government is doing is somewhat similar, they've just added a bunch of islamic

slogans to the same polices, is that he was seeking that latency, he was seeking to have the option to build a bomb, but he wouldn't do it unless there was a significant deterioration in the country's security or in the regional security. and there are two things that he was most concerned about was that he predicted, already in 1977, that saddam hussein would take the first possible opportunity to invade iran. he was very concerned about that. he was also concerned because american diplomat versus made it clear to him that since iran was not a member of the nato, the united states would not risk nuclear war with russia for the sake of iran. it would not help iran if the russians were to attack iran. and as a result, he wanted to have that option, but he also realized actually building the weapon would have a lot of strategic negatives. i think this current government seems to be pursue ago policy similar to those lines and then the question is what are we doing to make sure that while we are pursuing a policy and obviously pressure is always

going to have to be a component of some policy of this kind, to make sure this doesn't change that equation in the wrong direction, and i think the u.s. military has actually done quite a lot to try to signal that the u.s. is not looking, is not itching, for a military confrontation, even at the expense of all of the tensions that it currently is now having with israel. >> and i would like to be seen as -- -- >> [inaudible] >> late last year, when the talk about iran came to a certain level of seriousness, let's say, iranians seemed to be more lenient toward giving another chance, and they said okay, under pressure, iran chooses the way to diplomacy. for reason i can't explain, because time is on their

side, they got nothing from negotiating on the table and another thing, this is my personal observation as to when i was in iran, iran was to be a supplier country, a supplier of technology, not just a country which develops its own needs and for the syrians, but i also promised when i was there back in 200 five, 2004, and later on in turkey and also during the talks, they ultimately said why don't we share technology. so iran doesn't want to lose its facilities or face, either, because if iran is attacked, i suspect if iran can retap yale -- retaliate in kind, a worst case scenario, one option is -- the worst case scenario, the iran -- iranians attack.

>> so iran will not be able to retaliate if attacked massively by israel, so therefore this should not be the case, not only that they will lose their technologies but lose face before their public and also the world opinion of who is supporting iran's position. so time, diplomacy, is on iran's side. >> just to get specifically to the original question, it is probably one of the questions right now. we know sanctions are effective, but the question is, are sanctions effective enough to get the iranians to change their behavior or to change their opinion, and i think one thing the u.s. calculation is that the sanctions against the central bank, sanctions against the oil went into effect in july and i think the thinking is let's at least see how things

look after six months and whether they have that effect but i don't think anyone knows whether sanctions are strong enough to get the iranians to change the behavior and i think a lot of people feel they're not, and we'll see. >> and i already asked it but i'm going to take another go at it because i thought it was a very good point that was raised. you mentioned several times that the iranians have time on their side, they certainly seem to think so, but on the u.s. side as well there's a perception that time is actually on the u.s.' side because as michael said the sanctions are having a severe effect on the iranian economy, it's going to get worse and as a result, the iranian position will be softer down the road. i think both sides, frankly, are wrong. i think they are overestimating their positions and how things are working in their favor right now, and i think part of the calculation on the american side is that iran doesn't give in under pressure, it gives in under enormous pressure, and they're looking at the analogy of what happened in 1988 when khamenei agreed he would

never stop the war until victory was the slogan, but then he drank the cup of poison as he called it and agreed to the u.n. security council resolution calling for a ceasefire and they're looking at that, saying there was so much pressure, oil prices were at an all time low, saddam had been using chemical weapons extensively, the iranian military was in complete disarray 57bd under those circumstances iran had to succumb to the pressure. there's plenty of flaws in this in my view but there's two i would like to bring up that i think will important to keep in mind. one is that there were some clear choices that iran had at the time. iran knew, khamenei knew, that if he drank that cup of poison, the war would end. it is not the situation today. if they drink the cup of poison today, they don't know what will happen. will they have enrichment on their soil at the end of the

day, will the sanctions be lifted? they may, they may not. they perhaps could in the future. there's a lot ofo there is a lot of vagueness and ambiguity about what would happen if they were to do this. that was not what happened in 19 # eight. there was clarity that war would end. secondly, to obama's credit, obama is no saddam hussein. meaning he's not a brutal dictator that doesn't have to deal with a pesky congress, doesn't have to deal with a netanyahu government, doesn't have to deal with various lobbyist, all the different things that obama does have to deal with. saddam didn't have that. if he -- if you disagreed with saddam, you would be dead. so if he made that promise, he could deliver on it. the iranians have significant doubts as to whether the president of the united states is capable of delivering on something that they don't even know exactly what it is. as a result, this policy of just going for the pressure and sanctions in the hope that the iranians will become softer is so focused on the

effort to add pressure and is not sufficiently focused on making sure there are clear choices that actually the iranians will able to see. otherwise, it will be nothing more than naked escalation which will yield naked escalation from the iranian side. that's all we've seen so far. thanks. >> i think it's an oversimplification of what's going on. which is that the sanctions, the pressure, the sanctions, are designed not to force a final solution. bad choice of words. but that they're designed to get the iranians to talk. and it would cost nothing to the iranians to -- if they felt the pressure was getting very intense, it would cost iran nothing to sit down and say okay, we really want to get this thing settled, we want to have serious discussions, because the perception in all the talks so far, especially this round

in geneva, istanbul and istanbul, baghdad and moscow, is that despite all the talks, despite all the different modalities of getting together, there was no substance of discussion and the agreement that was reached inist tan button in -- istanbul in april was an agreement about how to talk, about how to go into talks, but there's not been one substantive stance to move towards an agreement, and i think the u.s. position is that there should be very strong pressure to get the iranians to sit down and start talking with the feeling that once they start to talk, maybe some assurances can be made. >> let me -- there's one more question. well, there's one more, okay? and then i will have to stop with the -- start with the final questions. go ahead, please. >> i'm with the national

iranian council. i would like to see if i could get a couple of comments from each of you on the following. contrary to what the u.s. government officially says is not backpedaling on affairs with -- or in their support of israel, do you guys think we're seeing a potential change in u.s. policy as a result of what we saw with the back and forth and their three times to call for support of israel? and the recent announcement that they are drawing down a military training exercise with israel. thank you. >> the question is, is there a real discrepancy, is there a real functional difference between israeli and the american position? are they going to go separate ways? is that the question? >> no. are we seeing a physical

change in -- >> [inaudible] >> oh. >> [inaudible] >> the current situation is one that's existed from the get go in this crisis, which is that israel wants to draw the united states in, they do not want to attack alone, so they want to get -- they want the united states, they want the international effort against iran. and this is real confusion in israel about what the red line is, how serious the united states is. and so the israeli government is trying to put a lot of pressure to get a clear statement to the united states, we will do this, that, our red line is this, or that. at the same time, the united states is trying to get a clear message out, don't jump the gun, now is not the time to attack, let's let the diplomacy work, let's let us have those six months to see if sanctions will get the iranians to talk and i think it's a tremendous amount of

jockeying. but i think overall, the u.s.-israel -- overall u.s.-israel alliance is strong, there's a real serious difference on this. as we go down to the wire, in the past, sanctions differed with israel on military moves. think of the sueez crisis. but i think you're seeing it played out in the discussions, stepping back from the military man offers -- maneuvers, is the expression of different tack tigs but how to go about the situation. >> a couple of things. i would like to agree with mike. i think it's important to note one thing. there is a significant amount of problems and tensions right now between the two governments and i think from the american perspective, there's a lot of frustration because of the feeling that the netanyahu government is trying to impact the elections over here, and interfering in that. when you do talk to officials privately, they do express significant frustrations. and of course there's been some of it has leaked out to the media as well, including

the very heated discussion between ambassador shapiro and prime minister netanyahu in israel, two or so weeks ago. will this amount to a strategic shift, i think it's too early to make a judgment about that. i would doubt that it would. but i think it's quite clear there's a very diverging view and an increasingly diverging view between the tpha*et -- netanyahu government and the obama administration, and also with relation to the arab spring and other things as well. >> eventually you guys will be in washington and the working government -- they will be in a much better position to make any comments, but based on my observation, in my year that i spent in the united states, and from my composition, israeli, jewish, american, americans are more complex people, more than any other in the world.

we cannot call this an alliance between country x and country y. if i were to look at the barometer, the level that okay, they are going to benefit from this, i mean, if iran would like to say the israeli-iranian relation -- move over, i would be -- i believe it would be a deadly mistake. if iran is somehow able to damage -- cause any damage to israel interests it will not be israel -- this is a personal conviction, i may be wrong -- but it may be the united states who will retaliate, rely, and show some reaction. it is something that i believe is also very well known by the iranians. many iranians living in the united states or in europe -- those who are leaving iran, i mean, iran is not a typical

middle eastern country where people are really oppressed and just under a dictator who says everything, tells them what to do. it's a big culture. and there are many iranians colors, -- >> [inaudible] >> and there is a report about the heart beat of the centers in the west, so iran is keeping abreast with the west, iran knows how the world is working, it's not just a closed society, unlike what is presented. even i was sitting there by -- for decades, before i went to iran for decades, i would say i was mistaken about iran. but after what i saw in iran -- iran and other places. so therefore, iran is following the world very closely. there are many people that

think about the iranian leadership, so they know what the reactions have been. that's why i said iran would not like to be hit because they know very well that the way -- at the end of the day, they will be hit by israel. iran will not be able to retaliate in kind because the united states will be there for israel. so this is something that has to be taken into consideration and something that will have to force iran to stay at the negotiation table. one thing, maybe i should have said at the very beginning, the first question , what is left to be done for iran. twenty, 40 percent enrichment? because now we are at a point where this is not the way the politics should continue. i mean, the united states must definitely give up looking at the situation to find a quick solution. it's not a fast -- it is a fast society but in terms of politics, we're dealing with

the civilization of iraq, china, iran, the civilizations are very difficult to negotiate. therefore, there's no way but negotiations, but the way you address or you entreat iran is -- if you just tell them what to do and they say okay, sir, we'll do it right away, don't expect that. >> we are almost out of time. i would like to ask one very final, brief question, and ask for brief comments if you wish. there have been some articles, some commentary with respect of journals, that, well, the flipside of the theory, which would be to find a way to bring iran into final compliance with some sort of agreement, and here comes the thought, to make iran a gain toroo guarantor of this system of nuclear

nonproliferation, is there in iran, from what you've just said, i get the sense that this could become an attractive idea or may be an attractive idea for some sectors in iran's society. please, brief comments, because those hypotheses have been written in journals, in the united states. >> if i could follow on from what i just said, if you go ahead and read the article, that i showed on the screen, and could focus on that, based on my composition in 2005, and afterwards, the people that are very close in these circles, and who mention the solution in the article, and the shock therapy, and iran and israel actually both -- don't have anything at stake, they don't have a water dispute, they don't -- you cannot force any two countries to fight each

other, so it's so ideological but the two sides, israel and iran, they are able to overcome these ideological differences, so what iran wants is to be treated as it is, as an original power, and the because you treat the -- and the statements you are using, and to be given a rule in the security structures, by just not discounting iran. so therefore, iran may be given a role in advancing -- that would make it more poufrl and they would be public to get something. >> a large part of iran's statements and policy social security very strong support from the -- for the mpt, and iraq was at the mpt

conference and they cite it ras a justification for the nuclear article which gives them the right to nuclear peaceful activities. on the other hand, there's an article two that says there cannot be proliferation of weapons or dealings in trying to develop nuclear weapons and that's the argument that the national community is using to oppose the u.n. security council resolution. so there's no question that iran is committed to the mpt, at least in the sense they haven't thrown out inspectors as north korea did, they allow safeguards, but they've cut down on some of those safeguards they were allowing. so it's a double edged sword. it's a double edged sword, as is the whole question of nuclear technology, and one could argue that very strong advocates in the mpt, they should simply answer these questions about possible military dimensions in their nuclear work. >> thank you very much. the final observation? >> there have been conversations about trying to

sow if this can be turned into a win-win, try to have what edward was talking about, having a fuel bank or even proposals about multilateralling the program, meaning there would be facilities in the middle east that would provide nuclear fuel for all of the reactors, and the response from the iranians have been very cautious in my estimation, and i think they're looking at the red lines. if there is an agreement, for instance, to have a multilateral facility, they're okay with it, as long as at least part of it is on their soil, but if it's going to be in jordan, it's going to be in qatar, in other countries, but nothing on the iranian soil, their going to say no to it. >> with that, i would like to, on behalf of the middle east program here at the center, and director of the international security studies program, i would like to thank you very much, i

would like to thank our speakers, particularly for very thoughtful and substantive presentation for debate. thanks, also, to molly usef, and kendra from the latin american program that helped us, and michael dardin, that helped to organize this. just one note. if you're interested on global issues related to global warming, on september 12, at 3:00 p.m., we will convene here on the sixth floor for a discussion or an evaluation of the conference that took place two months ago in brazil. thank you very much, you are always welcome. >> [applause] >>

>> watch and engage as the presidential candidates engage in 90 minute debates next month, they'll debate domestic policy october 23 hr-d in november -- october october 23rd in denver, and then hofstra university in new york, and then at linne university in boca raton, florida. you can watch all three debates as part of the road to recovery debates. >> in his weekly address, president obama focuses on the 11th anniversary of the 9/11 attac. then, wyoming senator john barrasso gives the republican address. he talks about the economy and recent employment reports >> this week, we mark the 11th anniversary of the september 11th attacks. it's time to remember that nearly 3000 innocent men, will and children we lost,

and the families that they left behind. it's a chance to honor the courage of the speurs respond -- first responders who risked their lives on that day and every day since. and it's an opportunity to give thanks for our men and women in uniform who have served and sacrificed sometimes far from home to keep our country safe. this anniversary is about them. it's also a time to reflect on just how far we've come as a nation these past 11 years. on that clear september morning, as america watched the towers fall and the pentagon burn, and the wreckage smoldering in a pennsylvania field, we were filled with questions. where had the attacks come from, and how would america respond. would they fundamentally weaken the country we love, would they change who we are. the last decade has been a difficult one. but together, we have answered those questions and come back stronger as a nation. we took a fight against al-qaeda, decimating their

leadership and put them on the path to defeat, and thanks to the courage and skill of our intelligence personnel and armed forces, usama bin laden will never threaten america again. instead of pulling back from the world, we've strengthened our alliances while improving our security here at home. as americans, we refuse to live in fear. today, a new tower rises above the new york skyline. and our country is stronger, safer, and more respected in the world. instead of turning on each other, we resisted the invitation to give into mistrust and suspicion. i've always said that america is at war with al-qaeda and its affiliates and we will never be at war with islam or any other religion. we are the united states of america. where freedom and diversity make us unique. they will always be central to who we are as a nation. instead of changing who we are, the attacks have brought out the best in the american people. more than 5 million members of the 9/11 generation have

worn america's uniform over the past decade and we've seen an outpouring of good will towards our military, our veterans and their families. together, they've done everything we've asked of them. we've ended the war in iraq and brought our troops home. we brought an end to the taliban regime. we've trained afghan security forces and forged a partnership with a new afghan government, and by the end of 2014, the transition into afghanistan will be complete and our war there will be over. and finally, instead of turning inward with grief, we have honored the memory of those we lost by giving back to our communities. serving those in need. and reaffirming the values at the heart of who we are as a people. that's why we mark september 1 #th as a national day of service and remembrance. because we are one american family. and we look out for each other. not just on the difficult days. but every day. eleven years later, that's the legacy of 9/11.

the ability to say with confidence that no admer saer and no act of terrorism can change who we are. -- adversary and no act of terrorism can change who we are. we are americans and we will product what we love. on this solemn anniversary let's remember those lost, lease reaffirm the values they stood for and let us keep moving forward as one nation and one people. >> hi. i'm dr. john barrasso, united states senator for wyoming, at the democratic convention this week president obama tried to make the case for why he needs more time to do the job he was elected to do four years ago. as usual, the president gave a lofty speech. but his vision for america's future comes down to bigger government, higher taxes, and more spending. the conventions are over now. the soaring speeches have ended. it's time for rhetoric to meet reality. the reality is america is not better off than it was four years ago.

today, 23 million americans are unemployed or underemployed, many are our friends, neighbors and family members. the undeniable truth is president obama is on track to have the worst jobs record of any president since world war ii. when the president was hyping his so called stimulus program, his economic team claimed unemployment would not go above 8 percent. and that it would be below 6 percent by now. instead, it's been higher than 8 percent for 43 straight months. it's bad enough the stimulus money was wasted, even worse, he borrowed the money. much of it from china. household incomes have dropped by more than $4000, while the cost of every day living has gone up. gasoline prices have gone up another 30 cents a gallon in just over a month. americans recently paid the highest prices ever for the labor day weekend. one out of every seven people in america is now on food

stamps. in terms of global competitiveness, the united states has dropped for four straight years. when president obama took office, we were number one in the world. now we're number seven. american businesses are at a competitive disadvantage because our tax rates are the highest in the developed world. americans know what works. low taxes. reasonable regulations. and living within our means. president kennedy understood that. he said persistently large deficits would endanger our economic growth and our military and defense commitments abroad. he said that 50 years ago, in 1962. washington's budget deficit that year was $7 billion. from $7 billion then to a $1.2 trillion deficit this year. for every year since he took office, president obama has spent at least a trillion dollars more than washington took in. all of it borrowed.

under his watch, government spends too much, borrows too much, and grows bigger every day.